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INTRODUCTION
Thirty-five years ago, the world watched in anticipation as Louise
Brown, the first test-tube baby, was born.1 Will Maya Butscher be the
next miracle baby marked by history? Her mother became the first
woman to receive a whole ovary transplant in 2008, after suffering
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1. The World’s First Test Tube Baby, PBS AM. EXPERIENCE, http://www.pbs.org
/wgbh/americanexperience/features/general-article/babies-worlds-first/ (last visited Jan. 18,
2013).
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premature menopause thirteen years prior.2 Physician researchers
at the Infertility Center of St. Louis, Missouri, transplanted Susanne
Butscher’s sister’s ovary into Susanne and, within three months,
she began ovulating naturally and became pregnant not long post-
transplant.3 Only months before in Denmark, a woman gave birth
to her second child; both children were a consequence of cryopreser-
vation and transplantation of her own ovarian tissue.4 After cancer
treatment threatened to rob her of the opportunity to have children,
Mrs. Bergholdt gave birth to her first daughter, post-transplant, with
the aid of in vitro fertilization (IVF), and baby boy Lucca was born
naturally only a year later without the use of assisted reproduction.5
Spurred on by the successes of other types of reproductive transplants,
researchers at the Gotheburg University of Sweden have permission
to pursue attempted uterus transplants in ten women at the end of
2012 and have thus far transplanted uteruses into four women.6 Some
of the potential participants are receiving donated wombs from their
mothers, making it possible for them to give birth to children out of
the same wombs that they themselves were conceived in.7 Meanwhile,
doctors in the U.K. have set up a charity to pay for the final stages
of their research and to begin experimental uterus transplants with
five infertile women.8 All of these children, as a collective, represent
the next possible breakthrough in the battle against infertility using
reproductive tissue transplants (RTTs).
At the intersection of organ transplantation and assisted repro-
ductive technology (ART), RTTs usher in a host of new ethical and
legal challenges which could change the face of both fields of medicine.
RTTs are the transplant of whole reproductive organs or organ slices,
and currently include ovary, uterus, and testicle transplants.9 RTTs
2. See Gordon Rayner & Rebecca Smith, Ovary Transplant Mother Speaks of Her
“Indescribable” Joy After Giving Birth, TELEGRAPH (Nov. 14, 2008), http://www.telegraph
.co.uk/health/women_shealth/3460954/Ovary-transplant-mother-speaks-of-her
-indescribable-joy-after-giving-birth.html.
3. See James Randerson, Woman to Give Birth After First Ovary Transplant Preg-
nancy, GUARDIAN (Nov. 9, 2008), http://www.guardian.co.uk/science/2008/nov/09/health.
4. See Helen Briggs, Mother Has Second Child After Ovary Transplant, BBC NEWS,
Feb. 24, 2010, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8534227.stm.
5. Id.
6. See Andrew Levy, Woman Set to Give Birth from Her Own Mother’s Womb After
World-First Transplant, DAILY MAIL (June 14, 2011), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/health
/article-2002938/Sara-Ottosson-Womb-transplant-mother-offer-25-year-old-chance-baby
.html.
7. See Linda Burke-Galloway, Is Using Your Mother’s Uterus an Option? (Oct. 24,
2011, 10:51 AM), http://drlindagalloway.wordpress.com/tag/sara-ottoson/.
8. Uterine Transplantation (UK) Charity, WOMB TRANSPLANT U.K., http://womb
transplantuk.org/index.php/uterine-transplantation-uk-charity (last visited Jan. 18, 2013).
9. See Valarie K. Blake, The New Frontier in Ethics and Infertility: Reproductive
Tissue Transplant, A Case Study of the U.S. and the U.K., 3 AMSTERDAM L. F. 25, 25 (2011).
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are still in their research phases, with even ovarian tissue transplants,
the most advanced of all of the procedures, still requiring Institutional
Review Board (IRB)– approved research protocols and all of the eth-
ical and legal requirements therein.10 Yet with all of their promise,
RTTs bring uncertainty as well. Mainly, these uncertainties include
whether we will be able to regulate these unique new procedures if
and when they roll out of research phases and transition into clinical
practice, and if they would be treated like ART or like organ trans-
plants. Such questions have implications for how we seek informed
consent from both donors and recipients of reproductive tissues, who
we permit to consent on behalf of a donor, how we decide who gets pri-
oritized access to these resources, whether people who would decide to
donate their reproductive tissues could get paid or whether that would
be forbidden under the law, whether donors would have any particular
parental rights over resulting offspring, disposition issues over cryo-
preserved organs, and proper research standards. Though RTTs are
still in research phases, it is not too early for policymakers, lawyers,
and ethicists alike to begin thinking about these new and unusual fer-
tility treatments and what they mean for legal and clinical practice.
This article will explore key regulatory and ethical challenges
presented by RTTs as they are currently developing, recognizing that
additional issues may reveal themselves as the technologies progress.
Part I of this article will begin with a discussion of the current status
of the technology, including the results and status of animal and
human experiments for all three types of transplants. Part II will
explore the demand for RTTs—who might consider such a transplant
and why RTTS might be considered by some patients as more favor-
able than other reproductive options. Part III will explore the differ-
ent regulatory channels which might apply to RTT, including organ
transplant ART and tissue regulations, mainly at the federal level.
Having analyzed which rules are likely to apply to RTT, Part IV will
discuss five key regulatory and ethical issues raised by RTT: research
requirements for fair and safe research of RTT, informed consent of
10. The majority of these statements deal exclusively with ovarian tissue cryopreser-
vation and transplantation, rather than uterus or testicle transplant, because the latter is
much further advanced. Testicle transplant is currently mainly underway and uterus trans-
plant research is only now beginning in humans. See, e.g., Ethics Comm. of the American
Soc’y for Repro. Med. (ASRM), Fertility Preservation and Reproduction in Cancer Patients,
83 FERTILITY & STERILITY 1622 (2005) [hereinafter Fertility Preservation]; Practice Comm.
of the ASRM & Practice Comm. of the Soc’y for Assisted Repro. Tech., Ovarian Tissue and
Oocyte Cryopreservation, 90 FERTILITY & STERILITY S241 (2008) [hereinafter Ovarian
Tissue and Oocyte Preservation]; Comm. on Gynecologic Practice, Ovarian Tissue and
Oocyte Cryopreservation, 111 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 1255 (2008); FIGO Comm. for
the Ethical Aspects of Human Repro. and Women’s Health, Ethical Considerations and
Recommendations on Oocyte and Ovarian Cryopreservation, 2006 INT’L J. GYNECOLOGY
& OBSTETRICS 92 (2006).
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donors and recipients if RTTs become clinically available, allocation
of reproductive organs, payment for potential donors, parental rights
of donors, and disposition of cryopreserved organs.
I. TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCEMENTS IN REPRODUCTIVE
TISSUE TRANSPLANTS
Research on RTTs must undergo a number of phases before the
procedures are shown to be suitable as a clinical treatment for infer-
tile patients. First, animal studies typically precede experiments in
humans to ensure certain levels of efficacy and safety and to develop
and improve technique.11 Even at the human level, researchers are
looking at the viability and efficacy of different sources of RTT organs,
particular surgical techniques, and best methods for cryopreservation.
In terms of transplant location, researchers have several options to
explore. Autograft occurs when the reproductive tissue is removed and
then transplanted in the same individual’s body.12 In isograft, tissue
is transplanted between identical twins, and in allograft, tissue is do-
nated from one human donor into a separate human recipient.13 In
addition, RTTs are being experimented with in the original location
of the reproductive organ (orthotopic transplant), and also in other
body regions, like the forearm or stomach.14 The success and attempt
of each of these levels varies with each type of RTT.
A. Ovarian Tissue Transplant
Ovarian tissue transplant (OTT) is, to date, the most techno-
logically advanced and successful of all the RTTs, with a number of
human experiments showing great promise.15 Still, OTT is considered
experimental, and all major reproductive societies recommend that
protocols for human experimentation be regulated by research stan-
dards and undergo IRB approval before human participation.16 OTT
would hold potential for a wide variety of individuals with ovarian-
factor infertility, most notably women undergoing cancer treatment
11. See Anna S. Olsson et al., Animal Research Ethics, in HANDBOOK OF LABORATORY
ANIMAL SCIENCE, 13, 18 (2d ed. 2003).
12. Organ Transplant Ethics, FOUNTIA, http://www.fountia.com/organ-transplant
-ethics (last visited Jan. 18, 2013).
13. Id.
14. The latter type of transplant, of course, would require more extensive use of tech-
nology to achieve pregnancy. The woman would need to undergo treatments to harvest
eggs from the arm or stomach and then have those eggs be fertilized in vitro, before the
resulting embryos were implanted into the woman.
15. See Fertility Preservation, supra note 10, at 1624–25.
16. Id. at 1625.
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who may be able to bank ovaries prior to undergoing chemotherapy.17
The first successful OTT occurred in 2004, when a patient rendered
infertile from treatment for Hodgkins lymphoma gave birth after re-
ceiving an autografted transplant of ovarian tissue.18 The patient had
biopsy samples of her ovarian tissue frozen in 1997 prior to the initia-
tion of chemotherapy, and in 2003, when her cancer was in remission,
physicians freeze-thawed the tissue and laparoscopically transplanted
the tissue orthotopically.19 Eleven months after transplantation, physi-
cians were able to confirm the presence of a live pregnancy.20 The
researchers recommended, as a consequence of their success, that all
young women with cancer be given the choice to cryopreserve their
ovarian tissue prior to onset of chemotherapy as a mechanism to
preserve fertility.21 In a different study, sixteen young female cancer
patients underwent ovarian autotransplantation with frozen tissue,
with all women experiencing the return of normal menstruation.22
In that same study, isograft of fresh ovarian tissue was attempted
in nine women with identical twin sibling donations.23 Again, all recip-
ients who had previous premature ovarian failure developed normal
menstrual cycles within five months post-transplant.24 In a combi-
nation of the fresh and frozen tissue transplants, fourteen total preg-
nancies were established and eight healthy live births occurred, and
two ongoing conceptions were present.25 Six transplant recipients
were able to conceive naturally, and one individual conceived twice.26
The same study suggested that transplanted tissue can function as
17. Ovarian Tissue and Oocyte Cryopreservation, supra note 10, at S241–42 (noting a
variety of other conditions which might indicate oocyte or ovarian tissue cryopreservation
including: patients undergoing bone marrow or stem cell transplants, oophorectomy for
benign tumors and endometriosis, autoimmune diseases like some severe forms of lupus).
18. See J. Donnez et al., Livebirth After Orthotopic Transplantation of Cryopreserved
Ovarian Tissue, LANCET 1 (Sept. 24, 2004), available at http://www.uclsaintluc.be/presse
/communiques/2004/2004-tamara-lancet-complet.pdf (showing that the patient had biopsy
samples of her ovarian tissue frozen in 1997, and in 2003, physicians freeze-thawed the tis-
sue and laparoscopy transplanted the tissue. Between five and nine months, regular ovu-
lation cycles began.).
19. See id. (finding that menstrual cycles and hormonal measurements began to show
signs of success at five months, with the woman experiencing menstruation from five to
nine months post-transplant).
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. See Sherman Silber et al., Duration of Fertility After Fresh and Frozen Ovary
Transplantation, 94 FERTILITY & STERILITY 2191, 2191 (2010) (showing that researchers
were able to use a thawing technique for frozen tissue which resulted in a 89 percent
preservation rate).
23. See id. (showing a twin sister who had undergone unexplained menopause at age
fourteen received grafted ovarian tissue from her sister at age twenty-four. She became
pregnant during her second menstrual cycle and delivered a full-term baby.).
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 2193.
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long as eight years post-transplant.27 In both autograft and isograft
cases, women did not need to undergo anti-rejection therapies because
the tissue was a biological match. Moreover, in isograft, the donor egg
genetic materials were identical to the recipient’s gametes because
the siblings were identical.
In 2007, a transplantation of ovarian tissue between non-identi-
cal siblings became the first successful allograft.28 Allograft between
siblings—and thus successful use of anti-rejection therapies—paves
the way for donation between non-related persons and opens the gate
for ovarian tissue transplants to be applied to a much wider popula-
tion of infertile women. With increased efforts in this area, women
without the opportunity or ability to bank their own tissue—and with-
out twin siblings—may be able to participate in RTT. This last type of
transplant poses the greatest number of legal and ethical challenges
because of the use of an outside donor.29 Of course, allograft would
necessarily involve some measure of anti-rejection therapy, which
also raises controversy.30
Data to date has suggested that not only is ovarian tissue trans-
plant possible, but it is also quite robust and effective for some in-
dividuals.31 In 2010, a woman in Denmark gave birth to her second
baby resulting from transplant, nearly four years after having under-
gone transplant and without the aid of assisted reproduction.32 Thus,
unlike ART, where the woman must undergo interventions each
time she wishes to have a child, RTTs have the possibility of being
a one-time intervention which can provide women years of reproduc-
tive viability.
27. Id. at 2194.
28. Jacques Donnez et al., Live Birth After Allografting of Ovarian Cortex Between
Genetically Non-Identical Sisters, 26 HUM. REPROD. 1384, 1384–85 (2011).
29. Mohamed A. Bedaiwy et al., Reproductive Organ Transplantation: Advances and
Controversies, 90 FERTILITY & STERILITY 2031, 2050 (2008).
30. See Tiffany Sharples, A Hope to Preserve Fertility: Ovarian Transplants, TIME,
Mar. 10, 2009, http://www.time.com/time/health/article/0,8599,1883894,00.html (arguing
that an individual will require less anti-rejection medication when she is related to the
individual donating. Compared to other types of transplants, RTTs will also require less
anti-rejection therapy because maintenance of the organ is not necessary for life, thus
physicians will be more willing to take a risk in the transplant failing, says Dr. Sherman
Silber, a leading expert in the area of RTT.). See also Bedaiwy et al., supra note 29, at 2043
(arguing that controversy over whether anti-rejection regimes are safe for the developing
fetus is ripe. The gold standard for determining whether a transplant is considered suc-
cessful now includes whether a woman undergoing anti-rejection medication was able to
become safely pregnant without harm to the resulting child.).
31. See Briggs, supra note 4.
32. See id. (showing that Stinne Holm Bergholdt and her physicians were very sur-
prised when she became pregnant naturally several years post-transplant. Ms. Bergholdt
underwent autograft of her own cryopreserved tissue through the aid of physicians in
Denmark.).
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B. Uterus Transplant
Uterus transplants are less advanced and have shown promise
only in animal models to date.33 In its most simplistic terms, uterine
transplants involve the transplantation of a uterus—from a deceased
or living donor—into a woman, the onset of anti-rejection therapies,
and then embryo implantation into the transplanted uterus to pro-
duce a pregnancy.34 Because of the difficulties in attaching the uterus
to other reproductive organs, researchers are not currently contem-
plating a transplant which would involve natural conception or birth.
Instead, some artificial means of fertilization and cesarean birth
would be necessary.35 Once the woman has completed birth, the uterus
would be surgically removed and immunosuppression drugs would
eventually be stopped.36
In animal models, researchers have succeeded at autotransplant-
ing uteruses in both sheep and dogs and have a successful record of
live births in mice.37 Attempts with rhesus monkeys have been suc-
cessful for autotransplant, but not donor transplant, and no viable,
living pregnancies have resulted.38 Moreover, physicians anticipate
several hurdles in applying animal studies to the human model, given
differences in “anatomy, graft size and tissue resistance in humans
compared with non-human animals” as well as the complexity of the
organ itself and the large number of blood supplies necessary to re-
connect in order to make transplant successful.39
The world’s first human uterus transplant was attempted in 2000
in Saudi Arabia when a young woman underwent allograft from a
donor uterus.40 Though the woman experienced two cycles of menstru-
ation, the blood supply to the uterus became inadequate due to a kink
33. Mats Brännström et al., Experimental Uterus Transplantation, 3 HUM. REPROD.
UPDATE 329, 329 (2010).
34. Helen Pearson, Infertility Researchers Target Uterus Transplant, 445 NATURE 466
(2007), available at http:/www.nature.com/nature/journal/v445/n7127/pdf/445466a.pdf.
35. Otherwise, physicians would also have to master attaching the uterus to ovaries,
fallopian tubes, and the vaginal canal, further complicating the procedure and drawing
upon an already limited blood supply. The failure of the uterus to be connected to the birth
canal poses greater risk than traditional pregnancy, however, because there is no mech-
anism for the child to be birthed other than surgical intervention.
36. Brännström et al., supra note 33, at 338.
37. Id. at 339; Anjana Nair et al., Uterus Transplant, 1127 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. OF SCI.
83, 86 (2008).
38. See Albert Altchek, Uterus Transplantation, 70 MT. SINAI J. MED. 154, 162 (2003).
39. Bedaiwy et al., supra note 29, at 2037; Ruby Catsanos et al., The Ethics of Uterus
Transplantation, 27 BIOETHICS 59, 67 (2013), available at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com
/doi/10.1111/j.1467-8519.2011.01897.x/pdf.
40. Castano et al., supra note 39, at 59.
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in a nearby artery, and the tissue became necrotic, forcing removal
ninety-nine days post-transplant.41 Yet, the progress of certain sur-
gical techniques has led researchers to hope that uterus transplant
will someday be possible in humans. First, in 2007, a human uterus
was successfully removed from a patient who was dead by neurologi-
cal criteria.42 Additionally, uterus reattachment is possible and is a
surgical technique currently used clinically to preserve the uterus of
patients with cervical cancer.43 The 2000 transplant failed because of
poor surgical placement, not rejection of the uterus, showing some
promise for future applications.44
A current uterus transplant attempt was made in Turkey in
August of 2011.45 To date, the organ remains viable with no signs of
rejection46 This transplanted uterus was sourced from a cadaver.47
Researchers continue to seek approval from their institutions
to attempt uterus transplant in female volunteers.48 New York
Downtown Hospital and its team of researchers have received IRB
approval to begin recruiting female subjects for transplant with ca-
daver uteruses.49 Moreover, a research team in Sweden began re-
cruiting participants for an attempt at transplant and has so far
achieved transplant in four participants.50 The group has had success
in animal models, including primates, which they believe are the best
predictor of human success because of their similarity to human’s vas-
cular connections, pelvis shape, and uterus.51 At least two women
have already been selected as participants for the experiment.52 U.K.
physicians believe that they are ready to experiment on humans and
have been recruiting research funds and volunteers for attempted
41. See Denise Grady, Medical First: A Transplant of a Uterus, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7,
2002, http://www.nytimes.com/2002/03/07/world/medical-first-a-transplant-of-a-uterus
.html (involving a transplant from a forty-six-year-old woman to a twenty-six-year-old
female who had underwent hysterectomy for a hemorrhage post-childbirth. The proce-
dure had particular importance in Saudi Arabia and other Muslim countries where trans-
plant of genetic material—like embryos or gametes—is impermissible but transplant of
a uterus is permissible.).
42. See Pearson, supra note 34, at 467.
43. Id. at 466.
44. See Grady, supra note 41.
45. Transplanted Uterus 120 Days Old, UTERUS TRANSPLANTATION PROJECT (Dec. 8,
2011, 1:22 PM), http://www.uterustransplantation.se/en/content/transplanted-uterus-120
-days-old.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Arthur L. Caplan et al., Moving the Womb, 37 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 18, 18 (2007).
49. Id.
50. Where Are We Today?, UTERUS TRANSPLANTATION PROJECT (2012), http://www
.uterustransplantation.se/en/patient/where-are-we-today (last visited Jan. 18, 2013).
51. Id.
52. See Burke-Galloway, supra note 7.
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transplants.53 The physicians have yet to seek ethics approval for
their experiments.54
Like ovarian tissue transplants, women will need to undergo
anti-rejection therapies to avoid rejection of the foreign organ.55
Moreover, unlike OTT, a uterus transplant will involve a surgical
procedure for the donor—whether deceased or living—chronologically
close to the donee’s surgery, because freezing methods for uteruses
are not as advanced as in ovaries.56
C. Testicular Tissue Transplant
Testicle transplants have received much less attention, likely
due to the fact that sperm retrieval and storage is fairly cheap and
effective and resolves most male-factor infertility.57 However, sperm
retrieval is not an option for pre-adolescent boys, and thus testicle
cryopreservation and transplants would present a new reproductive
option for young males facing infertility from chemotherapy or other-
wise.58 To date, research has focused on isolating and cryopreserving
the germ cells which give rise to testicles in hopes that they could be
autotransplanted back into the individual and successfully produce
sperm.59 Attempts to cryopreserve testicles have been successful in
animal models since the mid-1990s, and spermatogenesis has been
restored post-transplant in mice.60 Human testicular freezing has
been reported in a number of cases, but spermatogenesis was not
reported.61 Reports of successful transplants in humans are minimal.
Dr. Sherman Silber claims to have successfully transplanted a tes-
ticle between identical twin brothers in the 1970s, with the infertile
brother having five children as a result.62
53. Womb Transplantation in the Future, WOMB TRANSPLANT U.K., http://womb
transplantuk.org/index.php/current-research/future (last visited Jan. 18, 2013).
54. Id.
55. Risks and Signs of Rejection, UTERUS TRANSPLANTATION PROJECT, http://www
.uterustransplantation.se/en/patient/risks-and-signs-rejection (last visited Jan. 18, 2013).
56. Operation, UTERUS TRANSPLANTATION PROJECT, http://www.uterustransplantation
.se/en/patient/operation (last visited Jan. 18, 2013).
57. See Kanit Samanpachin et al., Super-Microsurgery for Testis Organ Transplantation
and Cryopreservation, 1 ACAD. COLLABORATIONS FOR SICK CHILDREN 42, 42 (2009) (noting
that successful sperm cryopreservation dates as far back as the 1950s when researchers
successfully froze bovine sperm, closely followed in 1953 with the preservation of human
sperm. Sperm preservation is much easier than egg freezing because the quantity of water
in eggs crystallizes when frozen and essentially warps the resulting thawed egg.).
58. Id.
59. Robert E. Brannigan, Fertility Preservation in Adult Male Cancer Patients, in
ONCOFERTILITY 28 (T.K. Woodruff & K.A. Snyder eds., 2007).
60. Id. at 45.
61. Samanpachin et al., supra note 57, at 43.
62. Sharples, supra note 30.
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Like uterus and ovary transplants, anti-rejection therapies will
be necessary with any allograft attempts of testicle transplants.
II. A DEMAND FOR REPRODUCTIVE TISSUE TRANSPLANTS
Transplantation of ovaries, uteruses, and testicles present new
possibilities for patients with a variety of fertility conditions, includ-
ing some conditions which were previously untreatable. The types
of patients that might benefit from RTT over other types of fertility
options will depend greatly on the type of RTT, whether a donor is
necessary, the individual’s preferences, the benefits and burdens of
current alternative options, and how well RTTs develop into more
cost-effective and efficacious treatments when compared with exist-
ing options.
Currently, without further advancement of RTTs, a number of
options exist for infertile patients. Adoption is one option for individ-
uals wanting a child, though it can be an expensive process and does
not satisfy some people’s goals of having a genetically related child.63
For some types of infertility, hormonal therapies or artificial insemi-
nation may work.64 Other types of assisted reproduction may treat
more complex fertility issues. Gamete intrafallopian transfers (GIFT)
and zygote intrafallopian transfers (ZIFT) involve the transfer of
eggs and sperm or zygote into a woman’s fallopian tubes.65 Intracyto-
plasmic sperm injection (ICSI) allows for direct insertion of sperm into
a woman’s egg, and can treat many male-factor infertilities.66 The
most expensive and invasive of all the ARTs is in vitro fertilization,
where a woman undergoes hormonal therapies and egg retrieval be-
fore fertilization of the egg outside the woman’s body in a petri dish.67
The resulting embryo(s) are implanted directly into the woman’s
uterus.68 For uterine-factor infertilities, gestational surrogacy is an
63. See Melissa B. Jacoby, The Debt Financing of Parenthood, 72 LAW & CONTMEP.
PROB. 147, 150 (2009) (showing that “[a]doption costs vary greatly depending on the type
of adoption and the characteristics of the child.” Whereas foster care adoptions can be rela-
tively inexpensive, some adoptions can cost as much as $30,000 or more. Additionally,
foreign adoptions can be time-consuming and expensive.).
64. See James Ringo ed., Assisted Reproductive Technologies, 10 GEO. J. GENDER &
L. 859, 860–61, 880 (2009) (showing that artificial insemination is a fairly simple and in-
expensive procedure—approximately $1,000 per attempt—when sperm is inserted into the
female reproductive tract).
65. Debora Spar & Anna M. Harrington, Building a Better Baby Business, 10 MINN.
J. L. SCI. & TECH. 41, 45 (2009).
66. ICSI is of course only appropriate for sperm mobility issues. When a man does not
have any viable sperm—as in post-cancer scenarios—ICSI will not be possible.
67. Elizabeth A. Pendo, The Politics of Infertility: Recognizing Coverage Exclusions
as Discrimination, 11 CONN. INS. L. J. 293, 300 (2005).
68. See id. (suggesting that IVF is more complex than another form of artificial in-
semination and showing that IVF resolves the largest portion of fertility deficits, because
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option. Here, a woman agrees to gestate and birth another’s child;
this is another expensive option, with a price tag typically around
$20,000.69 All of the above procedures may or may not involve the
use of donated eggs and/or sperm as necessary.
Given current reproductive options for women with ovarian-factor
infertility—including use of egg donors—OTT could present promising
new options for many of these patients. Until the development of
OTT, women with ovarian-factor fertility could not preserve their own
genetic reproductive materials because egg cryopreservation tech-
niques are not yet perfected.70 Thus, for women who are undergoing
autotransplant, OTT enables them to have genetically related chil-
dren, which gamete donation does not permit.71 Particularly, young
women with cancer in their reproductive years can bank their cryo-
preserved ovarian tissue to preserve their fertility before undergoing
chemotherapy.72 Egg cryopreservation techniques have not yet been
perfected, thus the clinical standard has been for women to cryo-
preserve embryos if they wish to preserve their fertility prior to the
onset of chemotherapy.73 Cryopreservation of embryos is a poor or
impossible choice for many patients. To cryopreserve embryos, the
woman must undergo hormonal therapies which initiate ovulation
and increase the number of harvestable eggs.74 The eggs are then fer-
tilized with sperm outside of the body, and the resulting embryos are
frozen and stored for later use.75 Women with hormone-responsive
cancers—when the cancer worsens as a result of hormonal increase—
are not able to undergo the treatment necessary to harvest eggs, and
some women are in need of such immediate treatment that there is
no time to undergo egg harvesting first.76 Additionally, adolescent
females and children who have not begun ovulating cannot undergo
egg harvesting, even though they have intact ovaries.77 Moreover, for
it offers the greatest amount of intervention. However, cycles of IVF can cost upwards of
$10,000 per cycle, and a birth resulting from IVF can cost a total of approximately
$67,000.); Spar & Harrington, supra note 65, at 49–50 (providing data on costs of IVF).
69. See Jennifer Watson, Note, Growing a Baby for Sale or Merely Renting a Womb:
Should Surrogate Mothers Be Compensated for Their Services?, 6 WHITTIER J. CHILD &
FAM. ADVOC. 529, 531–32 (2007) (“Currently, the typical fee for a first time surrogate
mother ranges from $14,000 to $18,000, with an average of $15,000.” Costs can be even
greater when the surrogate agrees to additional medical tests or to carry or implant mul-
tiple fetuses.).
70. Teresa K. Woodruff, The Oncofertility Consortium—Addressing Fertility in Young
People with Cancer, 7 NATURE REVS. CLINICAL ONCOLOGY 466, 471 (2010).
71. Blake, supra note 9, at 25–26.
72. Woodruff, supra note 70, at 470–71.
73. Id. at 467.
74. Id. at 470.
75. Id. at 467.
76. Id. at 470–71.
77. Id. at 473.
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single women without a reproductive partner, preservation of their
fertility required a male partner and may be less desirable than pres-
ervation of one’s own fertility singularly.78
For women who require donated ovary tissue, though genetic
reproduction is not possible, OTT may still be preferable to gamete
donation for a number of reasons. For some patients, a single surgi-
cal procedure may be preferable to repeated IVF attempts with donor
gametes. RTT allows for pregnancy the natural way—without the use
of technology—and the individual can have multiple children, rather
than singularly with each attempt at ART.79 For example, Stephanie
Yarber elected to have her sister’s ovarian tissue transplanted into
herself after several failed attempts at IVF and because she always
dreamed of having children “the old-fashioned way.” 80 There is also
the possibility that RTT could someday be more effective than IVF, as
well as less expensive. One patient who underwent tissue banking
paid $5,000 for the procedure instead of the $15,000 it would have
cost for egg donation.81 The woman who undergoes OTT will also ex-
perience ovulation. This is not present in gamete donation but may
be psychologically important to the individual.82
OTT may someday also enable women without disease-related
infertility to put their reproductive potential on ice while they pursue
social, financial, or professional goals.83 This is a highly contested use
78. Woodruff, supra note 70, at 470.
79. Id. at 471.
80. Sharples, supra note 30.
81. See Sylvia Pagán Westphal, New Way to Extend Fertility: Freeze Tissue from
Ovaries, WALL ST. J., Apr. 26, 2007, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB117755381630982975
.html. Costs are estimated at around $10,000–$20,000 for the process of stimulation and
retrieval, $500 for freezing and storage, $1,000 for thawing, and then $1,200 for an intra-
cytoplasmic sperm injection—when multiple efforts may be necessary. Alison Motluk,
Growth of Egg Freezing Blurs ‘Experimental’ Label, 476 NATURE 382, 383 (2011) In terms
of efficacy, a survey of sixty-four percent of U.S. clinics, forty-five out of 140 clinics had
not yet thawed a cryopreserved egg for clients, at least thirty clinics had yet to have a suc-
cessful birth, and eleven have achieved only one live birth, with only eight clinics achieving
greater than ten live births for patients. Id.
82. All of the above considerations may be viewed as important factors in a woman
undergoing autotransplant, as well.
83. See Westphal, supra note 81 (arguing that the issue is not applicable to uterus
transplant because a woman’s uterus does not deteriorate with time, and male fertility
remains later into life. In contrast, women are born with hundreds of thousands of eggs
which dwindle over her life span until only about 1000 eggs remain at age fifty); see also
Ovarian Tissue and Oocyte Cryopreservation, supra note 10, at S243 (noting that, given
the current risk-to-benefit ratio of oocyte and ovarian tissue preservation and the lack of
current knowledge about who is a proper candidate, as well as best methods for tissue col-
lection and freezing, and lower rates of successful pregnancy versus normal IVF, ASRM
does not yet recommend that ovarian tissue cryopreservation be marketed or offered for
women who wish to delay reproduction); Motluk, supra note 81, at 383 (arguing that while
this is the policy, there are critiques that this is not occurring in practice and that women
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of the technology which, as OTT develops, will certainly raise ethical
and legal controversy.84
Uterine factor infertility (UFI), except for some minor malfor-
mations, has always been untreatable.85 With the new possibility of
uterine transplant, however, there may now be a medical solution
for UFI patients who wish to carry and birth their own genetically
related offspring without the use of a gestational surrogate.86 A uter-
ine transplant could be medically indicated for a number of conditions,
including congenital absence of the uterus or acquired absence due
to fibroids, intrauterine adhesion, or hysterectomy—including ce-
sarean hysterectomies and hysterectomy indicated from cancer of the
cervix—among others.87 One study estimates that of the 62 million
women of reproductive age in the United States, approximately 9.5
million, or about 15.4 percent of this population, has UFI.88 Given cur-
rent fecundity rates, a majority of these women could be expected to
want to reproduce.89
Testicle transplants could enable men without these sex organs—
due to congenital, accidental, or disease-related absence—to conceive
naturally without the use of IVF or other forms of ART.90 For some
male cancer patients, testicular tissue preservation could enable
are banking eggs to delay reproductive aging without proper research protections in
place to ensure data is shared and efficacy is proven before becoming standard clinical
practice. For example, it is estimated that 2000 people worldwide have been born from
frozen eggs, including 400 in the United States, demonstrating somewhat widespread use
of the practice.).
84. See Imogen Goold & Julian Savulescu, In Favour of Freezing Eggs for Non-Medical
Reasons, 23 BIOETHICS 47, 47 (2009) (listing arguments in favor of allowing egg freezing
for reproductive delay or “social IVF” including: equal participation for women in employ-
ment, delay in allowing women time to find a suitable reproductive partner, more time for
couples to become financially stable and thus better opportunities for resulting children,
increasing the pool of available eggs and embryos for the medically infertile, and avoidance
of moral concerns raised by freezing of embryos—a significant problem as personhood
debates persist in the United States); Shiri Shkedi-Rafid & Yael Hashiloni-Dolev, Egg
Freezing for Non-Medical Uses: The Lack of a Relational Approach to Autonomy in the
New Israeli Policy and in Academic Discussion, 38 J. MED. ETHICS 154, 156 (2012) (citing
controversy over Israel’s new policies authorizing and regulating the freezing of eggs for
non-medical reasons).
85. Bedaiwy et al., supra note 29, at 2041.
86. Id.
87. Nair et al., supra note 37, at 83.
88. Id. at 84–85.
89. See id. One New York hospital recently published data on women seeking informa-
tion about uterine transplant at their hospital and determined that, of the over 500 women
who sought information, the majority were Caucasian, with ages ranging from twenty-four
to thirty-six, most were married, over half had some form of college education, and the larg-
est portion had hysterectomy from endometriosis. A. R. Nair et al., Applicants for Uterine
Transplantation: Description of Candidates, 90 FERTILITY & STERILITY S170 (2008).
90. Victoria Lambert, Fertility: Stop All the Clocks, TELEGRAPH (Nov. 26, 2009), http://
www.telegraph.co.uk/health/women_shealth/6651648/Fertility-stop-all-the-clocks.html.
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them to preserve fertility when sperm banking is not possible. For
example, such a procedure can be used if they have already had to
initiate chemotherapy and are not producing sperm.91 Preservation
of whole testicle tissue may also be an option for pre-pubescent males
who have not started producing sperm, where before there was never
a possibility of fertility preservation among this group.92 Testicle
transplants with a donor, like autotransplant of ovaries, may be pre-
ferred in cases where the individual wants to conceive naturally,
when a single surgery is preferred over repeated ART attempts, or
if testicle transplant someday becomes more effective or cheaper
than other options.93
All three types of RTTs may also have special implications in
different cultures where ART—or certain iterations of it—is not per-
mitted.94 For example, in some cultures, the use of a gestational surro-
gate or a gamete donor is forbidden or more strictly regulated because
each option is viewed as a form of adultery or incest.95 Moreover, in
some countries—and even in some states in the United States—where
parental rights are uncertain with respect to surrogates and gamete
donors, RTT may be preferable, depending on how the courts will
view them.96
III. POTENTIAL REGULATORY MECHANISMS
Reproductive tissue transplants (RTT) hold elements of both
organ transplantation and reproductive technology, making regula-
tion a challenging and unique prospect.97 From a medical perspec-
tive, they involve the transfer of human tissue either within the same
body or between a donor and a recipient body, in much the same way
as transplantation.98 Issues of allocation, consent for donation, con-
sent for retrieval, and payment are all raised as in transplantation.99
91. Brannigan, supra note 59, at 45.
92. Samanpachin et al., supra note 57, at 42.
93. Steve Connor, Doctors Plan First Testicle Transplant, INDEPENDENT (Sept. 24,
1999), http://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/health-and-families/health-news/doctors
-plan-first-testicle-transplant-742015.html.
94. See, e.g., Guidelines & Legal: Embryo Research, EUR. SOC’Y OF HUM. REPROD. &
EMBRYOLOGY, http://www.eshre.eu/ESHRE/English/Guidelines-Legal/Legal-documentation
/Italy/page.aspx/167 (last visited Jan. 18, 2013) (indicating that, for instance, Italy strictly
forbids the practice of egg donation. Whether they would permit oocyte banking for self-use
is uncertain.).
95. Rhonda Schuz, Surrogacy in Israel: An Analysis of the Law in Practice, in SURRO-
GATE MOTHERHOOD: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 35, 47 (Rachel Cook et al. eds, 2003)
(showing, for example, that traditional Jewish faith views surrogacy as akin to adultery).
96. See infra Part IV.E.
97. Blake, supra note 9, at 26.
98. Id. at 25.
99. Id. at 26.
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However, more akin to reproductive technologies, RTT raises issues
related to reproductive potential, who has authority to make reproduc-
tive decisions, and parental rights questions which are entirely new
and foreign in transplant medicine. How these medical procedures are
classified impacts which regulations apply and how many ethical and
legal issues will be decided with respect to RTT.100 However, because
of their uniqueness, RTTs do not fit wholly under a single regulatory
mechanism, and future clinical regulation will likely have to involve
an amalgamation of regulations to appropriately capture the com-
plexities of these new technologies.101
Four federal regulatory mechanisms are discussed which may
play a defining role in RTT: 21 C.F.R. Parts 1270 and 1271 Food and
Drug Administration (FDA) rules on tissue transplantation; Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services (DHHS) organ transplant rules;
the Fertility Clinic Success Rate and Certification Act (FCSRCA),
which regulates assisted reproductive technologies; and the Uniform
Anatomical Gift Act (UAGA), which regulates cadaver donation of
organs. Some of these regulations will or will not apply depending on
how RTTs are statutorily classified—DHHS versus FDA purview—
whereas others will depend on the specifics of the individual RTT,
such as whether it involves transplantation of a cadaver donor
(UAGA) or the use of assisted reproductive technology (FCSRCA).
A. Food and Drug Administration Rules vs. Department of
Health and Human Services Rules
The classification of RTTs has major implications on whether
they are regulated under FDA or the DHHS—and their encompass-
ing organ transplantation regulations. The division of labor hinges
on whether RTTs meet the classification for an organ or a tissue.
The FDA is the foremost government agency tasked with regulat-
ing food, drugs, and medical devices.102 It was originally created as
a consumer protection agency dealing with agricultural products in
the 1800s and later shifted its focus in the early part of the twentieth
century to the protection of the public from adulterated or misbranded
food and drug products.103 Among its purview are vaccines, bloods, and
biologics.104 This includes all “human cells or tissues that are intended
100. Id. at 27.
101. Id.
102. John P. Swann, FDA’s Origin, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov
/AboutFDA/WhatWeDo/History/Origin/ucm124403.htm (last updated June 18, 2009).
103. History, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/WhatWeDo
/History/default.htm (last updated July 29, 2010).
104. Vaccines, Blood & Biologics, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov
/BiologicsBloodVaccines/default.htm (last visited Jan. 18, 2013).
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for implantation, transplantation, infusion, or transfer into a human
recipient.”105 The regulations specifically cover “bone, ligament, skin,
dura mater, heart valve, cornea, hematopoietic stem/progenitor cells
derived from peripheral and cord blood, manipulated autologous
chondrocytes, epithelial cells on a synthetic matrix, and semen” and
exclude “[v]ascularized human organs for transplantation.”106
Human cell, tissue, and cellular and tissue-based product
(HCT/P) regulations require three main things. First, tissue estab-
lishments must screen and test tissue donors in an effort to reduce
communicable disease transmission through tissue transplant.107
Second, tissue establishments must follow written procedures that
are current good tissue practices established by the FDA.108 Third,
these groups must maintain records, including registering and list-
ing their practices of tissue transplant with the FDA.109
Vascularized human organ transplants are reserved for the
regulatory power of the Department of Health and Human Services
(DHHS).110 It achieves its work through the Organ Transplant and
Procurement Network (OPTN), which was enacted by the National
Organ Transplant Act (NOTA) of 1984.111 NOTA was mainly enacted
to ensure fair and consistent allocation of a finite and life-saving re-
source across the nation.112 Once a specific type of transplant is ac-
cepted under DHHS rules, it is no longer in the purview of the FDA.113
Currently, OPTN applies to the following organs: “a human
kidney, liver, heart, lung, or pancreas, or intestine (including the
esophagus, stomach, small and/or large intestine, or any portion of
the gastrointestinal tract).”114 In December of 2011, DHHS proposed
a new rule which would include vascularized composite allografts
(VCAs) on the list of vascularized human organ transplants that are
covered under OPTN.115 DHHS proposes that a VCA be defined by a
number of common characteristics. First, the transplant must require
connection of blood vessels (vascularization).116 It must contain mul-
tiple types of tissue that are recovered from donors, transplanted into
105. 21 C.F.R § 1271.1(d) (2011).
106. Id.
107. 21 C.F.R § 1270.21(a) (2011).
108. 21 C.F.R. § 1270.31 (2012).
109. 21 C.F.R. § 1271.10(b) (2012).
110. 21 C.F.R. § 1270.3(j) (2012).
111.  Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network, 76 Fed. Reg. 78,216, to be
codified at 42 C.F.R. 121 (Dec. 16, 2011), available at https://www.federalregister.gov
/articles/2011/12/16/2011-32204/organ-procurement-and-transplantation-network.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 78,218.
115. Id. at 78,220
116. Id.
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recipients as a structural unit, and minimally manipulated so as not
to alter the organ’s original utility.117 The transplant must involve ho-
mologous use, which means that it was used for the same function in
the donor as in the recipient.118 It must not be combined with another
item, like a device.119 It must be susceptible to ischemia, and thus be
only temporarily storable, and it must require immunosuppression.120
DHHS intends this to cover “faces, hands, fingers, toes, larynges, and
abdominal walls,” but the list is not exclusive.121
If DHHS applies to RTTs, then the National Organ Transplant
Act (NOTA) applies.122 NOTA established rules to qualify organ trans-
plant procurement groups. It regulates these groups and requires
standards for allocation, proper retrieval, and transportation of
organs.123 NOTA also calls for the OPTN to be operated by a non-
profit, private and federally contracted group, which has been ac-
complished through the United Network for Organ Sharing (UNOS).124
UNOS has its own rules for operations, mainly dealing with how to
transport, procure, and allocate organs among those in need of them.125
If DHHS has regulatory authority, then NOTA rules, specifically its
organ allocation rules, will apply to RTT. They will follow the unique
allocation rules set forth by both NOTA and UNOS.126 UNOS distrib-
utes organs based on a point system which assigns points according
to three principles: “sickest-first (current medical condition); first-
come, first-served (waiting time); and prognosis (antigen, antibody,
and blood type matching between recipient and donor).”127 The prin-
ciples are weighted differently depending on the organ, with some, like
heart transplants, weighing “sickest” the heaviest, whereas trans-
plants like kidney and pancreas emphasize “first-come, first-served.”
UNOS also considers geographic proximity to the available organ.128
However, before an individual can be listed on UNOS, local
transplant centers must agree to list the patient based on “medical,
117. Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network, supra note 111, at 78,220.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. About OPTN, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., ORGAN PROCUREMENT &
TRANSPLANTATION NETWORK, http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/optn/history.asp (last visited
Jan. 18, 2013).
123. 42 U.S.C. § 273 (2006).
124. Id.
125. Policy Development, UNITED NETWORK FOR ORGAN SHARING, http://www.unos.org
/donation/index.php?topic=policy_development (last visited Jan. 18, 2013).
126. 42 U.S.C. § 273.
127. Govind Persad et al., Principles of Allocation of Scarce Medical Interventions, 373
LANCET 423, 426 (2009).
128. OPTN, UNITED NETWORK FOR ORGAN SHARING, http://www.unos.org/donation
/index.php?topic=optn (last visited Jan. 18, 2013).
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surgical, and psychosocial suitability for transplantation.”129 There
is no standard requirement for what psychosocial factors must be con-
sidered to be listed for transplant, so these vary among transplant
centers and are at the sole discretion of the center’s committees and/
or transplant teams.130 Potential psychosocial factors considered may
include substance abuse and treatment, family and support network,
financial resources, past and present medical noncompliance, employ-
ment history, spiritual beliefs, access to transportation, psychiatric
illness, future goals, adaptation to stress and coping skills, relation-
ship with the care team, hobbies and interests, and military experi-
ence, among others.131 If RTTs were to follow an allocation scheme like
that of other organ transplants, it would be important to determine
whether, and to what extent, psychosocial criteria and medical cri-
teria such as those described above would be included in the decision
of who should get an RTT and why.
It remains unclear whether RTTs, collectively or individually, will
classify as VCAs under the DHHS rule or as tissues under the FDA
rule. Of course, the DHHS rule has not been finalized and definitions
may change.132 Uterus, ovary, and testicle transplants all require vas-
cularization, are minimally manipulated, are subject to ischemia, and
serve the same biological function for both donors and recipients.133
However, not all RTTs appear to be transferred as structural units.
The uterus must be transplanted whole, but ovaries and testicles can
be transplanted whole or as tissue slivers.134 Moreover, it is unclear
whether these reproductive organs contain multiple types of tissues
and whether multiple types of tissues will be used in each type of
transplant.135 Additionally, not all RTT procedures involve immuno-
suppression. Transplant of one’s own tissues or of an identical sibling’s
does not risk rejection, but allografts will require anti-rejection ther-
apies, making it quite possible that auto and isograft transplants
129. Nancy E. Flamme et al., The Influence of Psychosocial Evaluation on Candidacy
for Liver Transplantation, 18 PROGRESS IN TRANSPLANTATION 89 (2008).
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Policy Management, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., ORGAN PROCUREMENT
AND TRANSPLANTATION NETWORK, available at http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/plain
language.asp (last visited Jan. 18, 2013).
133. Roger G. Gosden, Focus on Fertility Preservation: Ovary and Uterus Transplan-
tation, 136 REPROD. 671, 676 (2008).
134. Id.
135. The uterus contains both smooth muscle and epithelial tissue, the testicle and ovary
are both epithelium, and all three are encased in some form of connective tissue. Depending
on how these different transplants continue to develop and whether they include casings
as part of the transplant, this will impact whether they constitute an RTT. It is possible,
given this reading, that despite the similarities of RTTs, some RTTs may be classified as
VCA and subject to the DHHS whereas others will not.
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could be regulated under FDA whereas other donor transplants will
come under DHHS.136
The distinction between FDA and DHHS regulation in organ
transplant may be the first of its kind, given that autotransplant of
whole organs was never a preferred treatment before this.137 Indi-
viduals did not put a kidney or a liver “on ice” for later use. Likewise,
although organ transplants with identical siblings raised a similar
concern, this has never been an issue because NOTA’s purview was
previously defined by specific types of organs—liver, kidney, etc.—
and not by whether the transplant required immunosuppression.138
Although transplant of one’s own tissue does not raise many of the
key issues that should be covered by NOTA—like informed consent
and protection of the donor—transplantation by a sibling does.139
Although it is unclear whether the new DHHS rule will apply
to RTTs—at least those involving a donor—the intent of the new
rule argues for its application to RTTs. The FDA regulations were
originally designed to protect the public from adulterated products,
whereas the DHHS rules establish fair allocation of limited re-
sources.140 The new rule anticipated broader types of organ trans-
plant, like hand and face. RTTs, like these transplants, involve issues
of distribution and allocation, more than just whether the product is
safe for human use.141 Consequently the DHHS rules can handle some
of the complicated issues that will arise with respect to donation, re-
trieval, storing, and allocation of these materials, whereas the FDA
regulations only provide guidance on safety and registries.142
B. Fertility Clinic Success Rate and Certification Act and
Assisted Reproductive Technology Regulation
RTTs do not fall under the Center for Disease Control’s defini-
tion of assisted reproductive technologies (ART), which requires that
“both eggs and sperm are handled.”143 However, RTTs are a high-tech
136. Gosden, supra note 133, at 671.
137. Id.
138. 42 U.S.C. § 273(d)(2).
139. Kendra D. MacLeod et al., Pediatric Sibling Donors of Successful and Unsuccessful
Hematopoietic Stem Cell Transplants (HSCT): A Qualitative Study of Their Psychosocial
Experience, 28 J. PEDIATRIC PSYCHOL. 223, 226 (2003).
140. 42 C.F.R. § 121.8 (2000).
141. Id.
142. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., FDA FOOD CODE 2009, available at http://www.fda.gov
/Food/FoodSafety/RetailFoodProtection/FoodCode/FoodCode2009/ucm186464.htm (last
visited Jan. 18, 2013).
143. What Is Assisted Reproductive Technology?, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PRE-
VENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/art (last updated Aug. 1, 2012).
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manipulation of the reproductive system, not unlike in vitro fertil-
ization and other forms of ART, and additionally, many applications
of RTT will require some form of ART to achieve pregnancy.144
Federal regulation of ART is highly minimal. The Fertility Clinic
Success Rate and Certification Act (FCSRCA) applies to regulate all
labs where embryos are handled, including clinics where IVF is per-
formed.145 It provides minimal regulation—mostly administrative and
reporting requirements—and will likely apply to some phase of RTT,
even if only when the patient requires the use of IVF, such as during
a possible uterus transplant.146
Otherwise, ART is regulated on a state-by-state basis, with some
states simply not regulating and others regulating a patchwork of
issues, including embryo storage and disposition, gestational surro-
gacy, and inheritance for posthumously conceived children.147 To the
extent that RRTs require some form of ART, the FCSRCA will at
least apply to the application of the ART itself.148
C. Uniform Anatomical Gift Act
The Uniform Anatomical Gift Act (UAGA) developed by the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
(NCCUSL) applies in all states that have adopted its most recent
2006 iteration.149 The UAGA regulates all cadaver donations of ana-
tomical gifts, whether for organ transplantation or for scientific use.150
The Act defines “anatomical gift” as a “donation of all or part of a
human body to take effect after the donor’s death for the purpose of
transplantation, therapy, research, or education.”151 Donors can con-
sent to donate their organs during life, typically through a designation
on their driver’s license, will, or other legal document.152 The UAGA
also permits certain representatives of the decedent to donate bodily
144. Id.
145. Fertility Clinic Success Rate and Certification Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-493,
106 Stat. 3146 [hereinafter FCSRCA].
146. Id.
147. Valarie Blake & Kavita Shah, Reproductive Tissue Transplants Defy Legal and
Ethical Categorization, 14 AM. MED. ASS’N J. ETHICS 232, 233 (2012).
148. Policy Documents, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov
/art/Policy.htm (last updated July 24, 2012).
149. Unif. Anatomical Gift Act, UNIFORM LAW COMM’N (2006), http://www.uniformlaws
.org/Act.aspx?title=Anatomical%20Gift%20Act%20%282006%29 (introducing the UAGA
in 1968 and revising it in 1987 and 2006. The UAGA has been adopted in 45 states and the
District of Columbia.).
150. Revised Uniform Anatomical Gift Act (2006) (last amended 2009), at 3, available
at http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/anatomical_gift/uaga_final_aug09.pdf [herein-
after UAGA].
151. Id. § 2(3).
152. Id. § 2(6).
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organs and tissues when the wishes of the deceased are not known.153
Basically, this amounts to any close family member or caretaker, or
anyone who has authority to dispose of the decedent’s body.154 If the
deceased party’s wishes with respect to donation are unknown, the
spouse, adult child, parent, sibling, grandchild, etc. may have the
authority to donate the individual’s organs.155 The UAGA does not
specifically speak to reproductive organs, and reproductive organs
are not explicitly excluded from the regulation.156 The UAGA will
apply in any instance of RTT when a deceased person’s body is do-
nated, whether for research or clinical purposes.157 The Flowchart of
Applicable Regulations in RTT shows which regulations apply in any
given type of RTT.
FLOWCHART OF APPLICABLE REGULATIONS IN RTT
IV. ETHICAL AND REGULATORY ISSUES RAISED BY
REPRODUCTIVE TISSUE TRANSPLANT
RTTs, as a class and individually, raise unique ethical and legal
questions, in addition to echoing some prior legal challenges raised
153. Id. § 9 (including an agent of the deceased—who had the power to make a donation
during the decedent’s life like a guardian—and then in the following descending order:
a spouse, adult child, parents, adult sibling, adult grandchild, grandparents, “adult who
exhibited special care and concern for the decedent,” person who was acting as guardian
to decedent at time of death, or any other person who has authority to dispose of the
decedent’s body).
154. Id. § 9.
155. Id.
156. See UAGA, supra note 150.
157. Blake & Shah, supra note 147, at 233.
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by reproductive technologies and/or by transplant. Though RTTs are
still in their research phases, the unprecedented nature of these pro-
cedures calls for critical engagement on the issue of regulating them.
Particularly when donors are involved, informed consent will need to
capture aspects of both transplant and reproductive technology.158
Allocation of the resources, if donor transplant is possible, will also
be key, as will decisions about compensating donors for their efforts,
a major contradictory issue when comparing ART versus transplant.
Moreover, parental rights claims and dispositional authority issues
are raised, and for all RTTs, the issue of proper research ethics.
A. Research Ethics
Because all RTTs are currently in research phases, the issue of
proper research regulation and ethics is dispositive.159 Testicle trans-
plant is currently only in animal phases, but ovarian tissue transplant
is currently underway in human participants, and uterus transplant
studies of human participants are currently forming.160 Whether RTT
clinical trials are regulated under FDA or DHHS human subjects pro-
tections depends on which agency has authority over the research.161
However, the distinction makes little difference because the two bodies
of regulations mirror each other in most key provisions.162 The FDA
and the DHHS are virtually identical with respect to key provisions
like IRB approval of studies, definitions of minimal risks, authorized
representatives, etc.163 The UAGA and The FCSRCA provide no guid-
ance here, as they presume clinical practice rather than research.164
In general, all RTT human subject trials will need to seek IRB
approval and will need to obtain robust informed consent from both
recipients and, where applicable, donors.165 Moreover, in the case of
uterus and ovary tissue transplant cases, if DHHS regulations apply,
special rules exist for research involving pregnant women, human
fetuses, and neonates.166 Generally, such regulations require a mini-
mization of risks and require proper preclinical studies—on animals
158. Id.
159. Id. at 232.
160. W. Fageeh et al., Case Report: Transplantation of the Human Uterus, 76 INT’L J.
GYNECOLOGY & OBSTETRICS 245, 247 (2002).
161. Blake & Shah, supra note 147, at 233.
162.  Comparison of FDA and HHS Human Subject Protection Regulations, U.S. FOOD
& DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/ScienceResearch/SpecialTopics/RunningClinicalTrials
/EducationalMaterials/ucm112910.htm (last updated Mar. 10, 2009).
163. Id.
164. See UAGA, supra note 150, at 1; FCSRCA, supra note 145, § 2(a).
165. Ovarian Tissue & Oocyte Cryopreservation, supra note 10, at S243.
166. 45 C.F.R. § 46.201(a) (2009).
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and, when possible, nonpregnant women.167 Participants must be in-
formed of reasonably foreseeable impact on the fetus, and the research
may need to offer either direct benefit to the woman, or to the woman
and fetus. If there is no participation benefit, the research must in-
volve no greater than minimal risk and must be intended to generate
important biomedical knowledge.168 Particularly in RTT, because of
the vulnerability of many of the infertile persons being enrolled in
such trials, informed consent will need to make it clear that the re-
search is not intended to benefit the individual, but rather to obtain
generalized knowledge about the procedures.169 Disclosures of risks
must include the risks to the potential fetus and the individual—
including risks of immunosuppression—as well as alternative treat-
ment options that are available to the individual.170 One considerable
risk in cancer patients is the concern that the cancerous cells will be
transplanted back into the patient with the reproductive tissue trans-
plant, so histological evaluation of tissues is necessary.171 Participants
must also be informed of the likelihood of success.172
Some authors have suggested—in other areas of research re-
lated to gamete donation—that participants must be selected in a
just manner so that only those who stand to benefit from the re-
search can be selected for participation.173 In their example, it is un-
ethical to recruit infertile women as egg donors for stem cell research
on general medical conditions.174 Instead, these women should be re-
cruited for studies regarding infertility, and women from the general
public should be recruited for general medicine studies and treated as
healthy volunteers.175 In a discussion of these values to the case of oo-
cyte preservation studies, “women whose cancer treatments are likely
to adversely affect their fertility” are recommended as the best popula-
tion to enroll in such trials because they stand to benefit the greatest
from the developing procedures.176 “Fertility patients, reproductive
167. 45 C.F.R. § 46.204 (2009).
168. Id.
169. Angela Ballantyne & Sheryl de Lacey, Wanted—Egg Donors for Research: A
Research Ethics Approach to Donor Recruitment and Compensation, 1 INT’L J. FEMINIST
APPROACHES TO BIOETHICS 145, 150 (2008).
170. See, e.g., Dianne B. McKay & Michelle A. Josephson, Reproduction and Trans-
plantation: Report on the AST Consensus Conference on Reproductive Issues and Trans-
plantation, 5 AM. J. OF TRANSPLANTATION 1592, 1593 (2005).
171. Ovarian Tissue and Oocyte Cryopreservation, supra note 10, at S243.
172. 45 C.F.R. § 46.116 (2003).
173. Ballantyne & de Lacey, supra note 169, at 150.
174. Id. at 151.
175. Id. at 145.
176. Michelle L. McGowan, Participation in Investigational Fertility Preservation
Research: A Feminist Research Ethics Approach, in ONCOFERTILITY 209, 218 (T.K.
Woodruff & K.A. Snyder eds., 2007).
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oocyte donors, and healthy research volunteers may be suitable re-
search subject populations for the basic research associated with in-
vestigational fertility preservation techniques . . . but the potential
risks to their own reproductive health and the potential for commodi-
fication of their reproductive tissues” make them more vulnerable.177
When applied more generally to RTT trials across all types of repro-
ductive tissues, this will hold true as well. Persons who stand to ben-
efit greatest from the technology are recommended as the primary
audience for recruitment into clinical trials.
It is also important to note that the model of recruiting those most
likely to benefit has been used in clinical trials of ART generally, “but
one danger of this precedent has been that investigational techniques
have often moved into clinical use in the private medical sector with
professionally generated practice guidelines instead of using a model
of controlled clinical trials.”178 It will be important to avoid this and
ensure clinical trial applications for RTTs to ensure safety and efficacy
for generalized populations, and to ensure certain baseline protections
for participants.
B. Informed Consent in Clinical Application
Informed consent derives from the basic principle of respect for
persons and the right of individuals to make decisions about their
bodies.179 Informed consent can serve many functions: it protects in-
dividual autonomy as well as the patient’s status as a human being,
it prevents fraud and duress, it encourages doctors to consider their
decisions while fostering decision-making in patients, and it involves
the public generally in medicine.180 Informed consent has generally
been thought of as the anecdote to an overly paternalistic system of
medicine, allowing the patient’s voice to enter the equation as a true
consideration, equal to or greater than medical considerations.181 The
informed consent doctrine has developed in the courts over time, as
malpractice cases have increasingly defined the obligation of physi-
cians to ensure that patients are informed of the reasonably antici-
pated benefits, risks, and burdens of treatment.182
Generally, informed consent in RTT in a clinical context should
involve an explanation of risks, benefits, and burdens of treatment,
177. Id.
178. Id. at 213.
179. Alexander Morgan Capron, Informed Consent in Catastrophic Disease Research and
Treatment, 123 U. PENN. L. REV. 340, 366 (1974).
180. Id. at 364, 366, 369, 371, 374, 376.
181. Id. at 399.
182. Id. at 348.
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including the effect of immunosuppression on the individual and the
potential fetus, risks of surgical interventions generally, the statisti-
cal likelihood of viable pregnancy (as derived from research and clin-
ical data) and any other treatment options for the individual. Special
consent issues are raised with respect to RTTs that involve living or
deceased donors.
1. Informed Consent by Donors
Informed consent for donors in the context of RTT will signifi-
cantly differ depending on whether the donor is living or deceased.
Traditionally, living organ donors are a protected group and many
precautions are in place to ensure that a donor’s decision is free of
coercion and is fully informed and voluntary.183 Provisions to protect
living donors include a division of responsibility from donor and recip-
ient teams and specially mandated living donor advocates who protect
the living donor and ensure adequate informed consent.184 The added
precautions are in place because living donors expose themselves to
significant medical risk without any anticipated clinical benefit for
themselves, but rather for the benefit of the recipient.185 Special in-
formed consent provisions for living donors apply. OPTN requires
informed consent for donors according to applicable legal authority,
as a condition of approving the transplant center.186 It does not cur-
rently provide specific rules for deceased donors.187 DHHS’s Advisory
Committee on Organ Transplantation does provide a lengthy list of
recommendations related to living donation.188 Within informed con-
sent, the donor must have decision-making capacity and must be will-
ing to donate. The donor should be free from coercion, medically and
psychosocially suitable, fully informed of the risks and benefits to the
donor, and fully informed of the risks, benefits, and alternative treat-
ment options for recipients.189 The Center for Medicare and Medicaid
183. 42 C.F.R. § 482.98(d) (2007).
184. Id.
185. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., ORGAN PROCUREMENT & TRANSPLANTA-
TION NETWORK, POLICIES: LIVING DONATION 12.2 (Dec. 13, 2012), available at http://optn
.transplant.hrsa.gov/PoliciesandBylaws2/policies/pdfs/policy_172.pdf [hereinafter OPTN,
LIVING DONATION] (noting the importance of informed consent for living kidney donors).
186. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., ORGAN PROCUREMENT & TRANSPLANTA-
TION NETWORK, POLICIES: MINIMUM PROCUREMENT STANDARDS FOR AN ORGAN PROCURE-
MENT ORGANIZATION (OPO) (Sept. 1, 2012), available at http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov
/PoliciesandBylaws2/policies/pdfs/policy_2.pdf [hereinafter OPTN, MINIMUM PROCURE-
MENT STANDARDS].
187. Id.
188. Summary Recommendations to the Secretary, DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS.,
ADVISORY COMM. ON ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION, http://organdonor.gov/legislation/acot
summaryrec.html (last visited Jan. 18, 2013).
189. Id.
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requires that consent include an understanding of the following: the
confidentiality of the communication between donor and transplant
center; the evaluation process and surgical procedure; the medical
and psychosocial risks; the alternatives to donation; data on medical
outcomes; the possibility of future health problems; insurance cover-
age concerns; and a right to opt out at any time.190
Informed consent for living donors of uteruses, ovaries, and tes-
ticles will be unique.191 For example, in donating a kidney, the donor
risks the need for transplant or death if his other kidney fails him,
and he may experience other medical issues from having only one
kidney, in addition to the risk of general surgery.192 Donors of repro-
ductive organs may experience some harms from donation that are
non-life-threatening, such as early menopause or hormonal difficul-
ties after removal of ovaries or uteruses, or experience risks of gen-
eral surgery, though surgeries in ovary and uterus transplant may be
less invasive if done vaginally.193 Akin to living organ donors more
broadly, however, all of these risks are at the clinical benefit of the
recipient, not the donor.194
Most importantly, however, the current living donor informed
consent standards fail to address reproductive concerns, i.e., the fact
that the donation is intended to create the donor’s genetically related
offspring for the upbringing of the recipient.195 ASRM clinical guide-
lines spell out the proper mechanisms for preventing communicable
disease transmission by the donor to the recipient of egg or sperm, as
well as proper screening to prevent genetic disease transmission to
the offspring.196 Similar guidelines will need to apply in the context of
RTT—specifically egg and testes transplants—when genetic materi-
als are involved.
Though the Fertility Clinic Success Rate Act does not provide
specific guidance regarding donors and thus is not a useful model,
general guidance from consenting gamete donors in ART may prove
190. 42 C.F.R. § 482.102(b) (2007) (noting that these regulations only exist with re-
spect to CMS certifications, approval, and reimbursement of a transplant center. At this
stage in RTT it is difficult to tell if RTT will be performed in traditional transplant pro-
grams and whether it would be covered under insurance, though these regulations provide
a useful model.).
191. Blake & Shah, supra note 147, at 232.
192. He also may have risked insurance discrimination prior to the onset of the ban on
insurance refusal for pre-existing conditions.
193. See, e.g., Gosden, supra note 133, at 671.
194. OPTN, LIVING DONATION, supra note 185, at 12.2.
195. Blake & Shah, supra note 147, at 234.
196. Practice Comm. Of the Am. Soc’y for Reprod. Med. & the Practice Comm. of the
Soc’y for Assisted Reprod. Tech., 2008 Guidelines for Gamete and Embryo Donation:
A Practice Committee Report, 9 FERTILITY & STERILITY S30 (2008) [hereinafter 2008
Guidelines].
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useful.197 Like living organ donation, donors of gametes experience
some level of risk—the risk is much smaller in sperm donation than
in egg donation—for the benefit of a recipient rather than the donor.198
The American Society for Reproductive Medicine (ASRM) Ethics
Committee published guidelines in 2009 to protect the interests and
rights of gamete donors, including informed consent considerations.199
ASRM recommends that gamete donors “be fully informed of the risks
of the process, including, but not limited to, the medical risks.” 200
Donors should also be informed that genetic tests may be carried out
and whether they will be informed of results.201 They should be in-
formed that donation will sever their legal rights to have contact with
any resulting child, that there might be a level of compensation, and
that they can seek independent legal counsel.202 They should be in-
formed of the emotional benefits and risks of donation and of the emo-
tional implications their donation may have on children they have or
will have in the future, as well as the possibility that the resulting
offspring may someday have the ability to find and contact them.203
These provisions surrounding consent and risks, benefits, and bur-
dens of donation are unique to donation of reproductive material, and
are simply not addressed by current guidelines or literature of other
types of organ donations.204 The ASRM provide some level of guidance
regarding risks of procedures not intended to benefit the donor—as
particularly gamete donors undergo some measure of clinically inva-
sive procedure to donate.205 The OPTN guidelines provide a greater
level of protection for informed consent, including understanding the
consequences for both donor and recipient, which is also important
and valid to RTT, like other transplants.206 Though it is premature
to speculate at what the ideal requirements of informed consent for
RTT will be, it will need to involve an amalgamation of both gamete
donor and organ donor guidelines to address the broad spectrum of
issues raised by RTT donation.
197. The reproductive aspect of gamete donation is somewhat inapplicable to uterus
transplant because it does not involve the transplant of genetic material. However, ges-
tational surrogacy informed consent is somewhat inapplicable to uterus transplant be-
cause, although both involve donation of a womb, gestational surrogacy involves much
more risk to the woman than uterus transplant, as the pregnancy and birthing occur in the
donors body.
198. Ethics Comm. of the Am. Soc’y for Reprod. Med., Interests, Obligations, and Rights
of the Donor in Gamete Donation, 91 FERTILITY & STERILITY 22, 25 (2009).
199. Id. at 24.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 24–25.
204. See, e.g., OPTN, LIVING DONATION, supra note 185.
205. 2008 Guidelines, supra note 196, at S36, S40.
206. OPTN, LIVING DONATION, supra note 185, at 12.2.
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RTT could also implicate deceased donors, which present distinct
issues from informed consent by the living. Whereas some attempts
at uterus transplant involve living donors, others have involved ca-
daver uteruses. Moreover, cryopreservation techniques of testicle and
ovarian tissue could lead to an eventual consideration of cadaver
donation. Again, the FDA and the FCSRCA provide little guidance
here.207 OPTN requires consent from the donor according to applica-
ble legal authority, whether living or deceased.208
With cadaver donation, UAGA would apply because deceased
donation places it in the realm of an anatomical gift.209 In deceased do-
nations, currently the UAGA applies for any type of organ or tissue do-
nation, whether of a reproductive nature or not.210 This measure was
set in place to increase the availability of life-saving organs and to re-
spect the presumed wishes of the deceased.211 This presents unique
and unusual results in the context of RTT when the anatomical gift
has reproductive potential (ovary and testicle transplants) for two
main reasons: 1) it essentially allows family members like parents or
siblings to make reproductive decisions on behalf of the deceased and
2) it provides for the possibility of reproduction posthumously.212 With
respect to the first issue, traditionally, reproductive decisions have
been confined to the individual or the couple.213 The only major area
in which reproductive decision-making is broadened beyond the scope
of the individual or the couple is in abortion by a minor, as some states
may require parental consent.214 The right to reproduce is seen in the
courts as a fundamental one, central to an individual’s identity, and
traditionally left up to the individual or the couple’s choice.215 Without
207. Pub. L. No. 102-493, 106 Stat. 3146 (1992).
208. OPTN, MINIMUM PROCUREMENT STANDARDS, supra note 186, at 2.4.
209. UAGA § 2(3).
210. Id. § 2(18).
211. Id. at Brief description of act.
212. Id. §§ 5, 9.
213. Blake & Shah, supra note 147, at 233 (noting that reproductive decisions are ones
that we do not traditionally leave up to our next of kin).
214. State Policies in Brief: An Overview of Minors’ Consent Law, GUTTMACHER INST.
(Jan. 1, 2013), available at http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_OMCL.pdf.
215. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 896 (1992) (citing Planned Parenthood
v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976) (ruling that “ ‘when the wife and the husband disagree
on this decision, the view of only one of the two marriage partners can prevail. Inasmuch
as it is the woman who physically bears the child and who is the more directly and
immediately affected by the pregnancy, as between the two, the balance weighs in her
favor.’ This conclusion rests upon the basic nature of marriage and the nature of our
Constitution: ‘[T]he marital couple is not an independent entity with a mind and heart of
its own, but an association of two individuals each with a separate intellectual and emo-
tional makeup.’ ”)); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 169 (1973) (affirming the individual’s right
to choose); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (arguing that “the right of the
individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into
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the express wishes of the decedent being known with respect to post-
humous use of gametes, it seems inappropriate to permit family mem-
bers to donate eggs or testicles. Such an act touches upon broader
fundamental interests than other organ donations and, additionally,
does not have such a countervailing interest in preserving life to jus-
tify greater infringement on the deceased’s rights or interests.
Second, the context of reproductive tissue gifted posthumously
by family allows for posthumous reproduction.216 This concern is not
unique to RTT; ART in general has created this possibility with the
development of techniques to cryopreserve embryos and sperm.217 Gen-
erally, posthumous reproduction cases have dealt with spousal re-
quests to use a preserved embryo or sperm sample.218 The request by
other family members is much more controversial and also much less
common. It would require more caution, and may never be permissi-
ble in the context of RTT, unless the wishes of the donor are known.219
With spousal posthumous reproduction, ASRM is generally viewed
as permissible if the wishes of the deceased have previously been
known.220 At the initiation of storage of gametes and embryos, indi-
viduals are encouraged to express their disposition wishes if they may
die.221 Though heavy philosophical debates might center on whether
and to what extent an individual has a reproductive interest or right
matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a
child” is inherent in this nation’s understanding of privacy).
216. Am. Soc’y for Reprod. Med. Ethics Comm., Posthumous Reproduction, 67 FERTILITY
& STERILITY 8S, 8S (1997) [hereinafter Posthumous Reproduction].
217. Posthumous reproduction is not to be confused with posthumous birthing, when the
child is born without both parents living. The latter is a common occurrence that can occur
without the use of technology, but the ability to conceive a child when already deceased
requires modern and special technology.
218. See Posthumous Reproduction, supra note 216, at 8S.
219. Hecht v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (showing that
posthumous reproduction legal cases have centered around issues of who is the parent,
property rights of decedent’s gametes, and inheritance rights of resulting children. In this
notable case, William Kane bequeathed his sperm to girlfriend Deborah Hecht for use at
his death. The court held that the sperm was a type of property which could be bequeathed
in Kane’s estate. Additionally, the court found that postmortem insemination was not
against public policy, nor that public policy forbid artificial insemination of Hecht be-
cause she was unmarried. Resultantly, Hecht was granted access to Kane’s sperm post-
humously.); see also Lisa M. Burkdall, Note, A Dead Man’s Tale: Regulating the Right to
Bequeath Sperm in California, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 875, 880–81 (1995); Sheri Gilbert, Note,
Fatherhood from the Grave: An Analysis of Postmortem Insemination, 22 HOFSTRA L. REV.
521, 558 (1993) (comparing a French court case in which a wife of a deceased husband who
had banked his sperm prior to chemotherapy asked for use of the sperm after his death,
and the court focused instead on “whether it was the decedent’s intent for his sperm to be
used to father a child after his death.” The court ordered the sperm bank to return the
sperm to the wife, focusing on compelling evidence that the husband would have wanted
his wife to have a child and the wife’s sacred right to birth.).
220. Posthumous Reproduction, supra note 216, at 9S.
221. Id.
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to control their reproductive potential after death, it is generally
viewed to be on more ethically solid ground to only perform posthu-
mous reproduction when the wishes of the donor are known and, when
applicable, the gestational surrogate and other relevant parties are
informed.222 Likewise in RTT, UAGA currently can be read as permit-
ting a wide range of close relatives and agents to donate reproductive
tissue on behalf of the deceased.223 As RTT develops, the UAGA will
need to address this unique aspect of anatomical gifts and should not
permit donation of reproductive materials, with a possible exception
of personal use by the spouse, and with similar protections in place
as other cases of posthumous reproduction require.
2. Informed Consent by Recipients
Recipients of RTT are also going to require a hybrid of some of the
considerations raised by other reproductive procedures, as well as
organ transplantation consideration, because of the dual nature of the
procedure. OPTN requires that recipients also provide informed con-
sent when receiving an organ, and particularly spells out documented
informed consent requirements from the patient or the patient’s rep-
resentative when there is a risk of HIV transmission.224 Apart from
these basic requirements, there is very little regulatory guidance or
guidance in the literature on obtaining consent for organ transplant.225
This is presumably because, up until very recently, organ recipients
have been in life-or-death situations.226 With the advent of quality of
life organ transplants like hand, face, or RTT, greater measures will
need to be in place to aid potential recipients in weighing the benefits
and burdens of the transplant to make a quality of life evaluation
that reflects their own personal wishes and values. An individual will
need to understand the medical risks at stake as well as the likelihood
of success in choosing to undergo surgery and receive anti-rejection
medications in order to reproduce. Again, guidance on consent for
other high-tech reproductive interventions like IVF may prove useful.
Additionally, however, the unique issues raised by receiving the
organs of another individual, deceased or living, may require addi-
tional requirements or considerations outside those raised by ART.
222. Id.
223. UAGA § 9a(1)–(9).
224. OPTN, MINIMUM PROCUREMENT STANDARDS, supra note 186, at 2.2; U.S. DEP’T OF
HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., ORGAN PROCUREMENT AND TRANSPLANTATION NETWORK, POLICIES:
IDENTIFICATION OF TRANSMISSIBLE DISEASES IN ORGAN RECIPIENTS 4.2 (Dec. 13, 2012),
available at http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/PoliciesandBylaws2/policies/pdfs/policy_16.pdf.
225. JOINT COMM’N ON ACCREDITATION OF HEALTHCARE ORGS., HEALTH CARE AT THE
CROSSROADS 16 (2004).
226. Persad et al., supra note 127, at 424 (describing the “sickest first” ethical principle
of organ allocation).
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C. Allocation Decisions
Another key regulatory issue relates to allocation of medical re-
sources, an issue with distinct outcomes depending on which regula-
tions apply. OPTN provides the greater measure of guidance on this
issue, as it was built to deal with the allocation of a scarce and life-
saving medical resources to those in need.227 OPTN provides different
guidance depending on the type of transplant in question, but mainly
the question of allocation revolves around medical urgency and dis-
tance criteria.228 Persons who are the best match and the most likely
to achieve the greatest benefit from the organ are the likeliest to get
it, because the system is based on gleaning the greatest use out of the
scarce resource.229 The use of psychosocial criteria likewise is applied
to ensure that individuals who will receive the greatest benefit and
longevity from the organ receive it.230 Apart from geographic criteria,
the system has great limits when applied to RTT. The UNOS criteria
have limited use when applied to uterine transplant.
First, it is unclear how medical prognosis or urgency criteria
would apply here, given that RTT intends to treat infertility, a dis-
ease which does not have a scale.231 Persons who are seeking out RTT
to reproduce will be likely more or less equally infertile. Certainly,
some individuals may be more likely to achieve pregnancy than others
(and we can likely measure some of these outcomes from previous ex-
perience with ART—for example, age decreases likelihood of successful
pregnancy). Prognosis (the extent to which the recipient would match
the donor uterus) could be quantified similarly to other organ trans-
plants.232 Additionally, some individuals may not be able to be recipi-
ents of uterine transplant for medical reasons. If they have significant
other health issues that would contraindicate organ transplant or
pregnancy generally, or if they are lacking or have scarred vascular
227. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., ORGAN PROCUREMENT & TRANSPLANTATION
NETWORK, CHARTER, art. II (June 24, 2004), available at http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov
/ContentDocuments/OPTN_CHARTER_II_-_NOV_04.pdf.
228. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., ORGAN PROCUREMENT AND TRANSPLANTA-
TION NETWORK, POLICIES: ALLOCATION SYSTEM FOR ORGANS NOT SPECIFICALLY ADDRESSED,
3.9 (Nov. 9, 2010), available at http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/PoliciesandBylaws2/policies
/pdfs/policy_11.pdf.
229. Id.; U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., ORGAN PROCUREMENT & TRANSPLAN-
TATION NETWORK, POLICIES: ORGAN PROCUREMENT, DISTRIBUTION AND ALTERNATIVE
SYSTEMS FOR ORGAN DISTRIBUTION OR ALLOCATION (Sept. 1, 2012), available at http://
optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/PoliciesandBylaws2/policies/pdfs/policy_6.pdf.
230. Facts About Living Donation, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., ORGAN
PROCUREMENT & TRANSPLANTATION NETWORK, http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/about
/donation/livingDonation.asp (last visited Jan. 18, 2013).
231. Blake, supra note 9, at 29.
232. Id.
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connections due to cancer or congenital anomalies, then uterine trans-
plant may not be medically appropriate for them.233 However, with a
large number of candidates, these factors will not likely provide an
efficient or complete way to sort candidates. Additionally, if the organ
should go to the person with the likeliest chance to benefit, this may
mean something entirely different, like an individual who is nearing
the end of her reproductive years or who has tried the greatest number
of attempts at commercial surrogacy. For this reason, a first-come,
first-served allocation system seems more feasible, though this raises
its own issues of equity and fairness.234 Some ethicists strongly cri-
tique the first-come, first-served method of distribution, because it
can be manipulated by wealthy individuals who place themselves on
multiple transplant lists or by transplant centers that manipulate
their patients’ healthcare state in order to improve their chances of
receiving organs.235
A special mention of the unique consequences of psychosocial
criteria in the context of RTT should also be mentioned. Psycho-
social measures should have been developed based on measures of
predictable medical outcome.236 They are social factors that impact
how well a person will recover from transplant, how likely they are
to follow through on a challenging and continuous medical regime,
etc.237 Because these measures have been based on long-term main-
tenance of the organ, they have limited application to RTT.238 The
case of RTT, after all, only requires short-term maintenance until
reproduction can be achieved.239 Within a pool of candidates who are
all likely to maintain the organ for the period of reproduction, then,
other non-psychosocial criteria should be applied, like first-come,
first-served. Moreover, the measures previously only considered suc-
cessful maintenance of the organ itself; in other words, did the can-
didate keep the organ and survive? In RTT for uteruses and ovaries,
success will be measured not just by healthy maintenance of the organ
but also by achievement of pregnancy, as that is the intended goal
of the organ transplant.
Committees making decisions about transplant distribution are
used to weighing the interests of many stakeholders.240 Stakeholders
233. Caplan et al., supra note 48, at 20.
234. Persad et al., supra note 127, at 424.
235. Arthur L. Caplan, IF I WERE A RICH MAN COULD I BUY A PANCREAS? AND OTHER
ESSAYS ON THE ETHICS OF HEALTH CARE 146–47, 169–70 (1992).
236. Flamme et al., supra note 129.
237. Id.
238. Id.; Nair, supra note 37, at 85.
239. Nair, supra note 37, at 85.
240. Flamme et al., supra note 129.
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in traditional organ transplant would include the patient, the living
or deceased donor, the donor and recipient’s family and support sys-
tem, the transplant team, etc.241 However, in the case of uterine trans-
plant, where the goal is to produce a viable pregnancy, some may
argue that there is another stakeholder involved: the potential child
whose birth is enabled by the transplant.242 In fact, scholars have
already assumed that the well-being of the child should be considered,
at least with regards to whether we should permit reproductive tissue
transplants to occur at all given the use of anti-rejection medications
during pregnancy.243
It is unclear to what extent psychosocial criteria could or should
be used to determine the well-being of a potential child, but it certainly
could lead to a slippery slope of considering the quality of the individ-
ual as a potential parent, rather than simply a recipient of an organ.
Debates have already formed around whether to provide ART to per-
sons with questionable child rearing abilities.244 Although there is no
systematic attempt—nor practical ability—to screen everyone who
reproduces coitally, the question has been raised whether ART candi-
dates should be screened like adoption candidates.245 As ASRM points
out in a relevant ethics statement, home visits are inappropriate be-
cause there is no current child to protect, yet providers of ART are
not removed from the psychosocial and other aspects of the infertility
patient and may occasionally see behaviors that they fear would com-
promise any resulting offspring. The ASRM ethics statement recom-
mends that providers may screen patients on the basis of offspring
welfare but are not morally obligated to withhold services.246
Other guidance on allocation in this context is rather slim. The
FCSRCA does not deal with the issue of allocation, and ART generally
is allocated as to who is willing and able to pay for the procedure.247
241. Persad et. al., supra note 127.
242. Caplan et al., supra note 48, at 19.
243. Id.
244. The Ethics Comm. of the Am. Soc’y for Reprod. Med., Child-Rearing Ability and
the Provision of Fertility Services, 92 FERTILITY & STERILITY 864, 865 (2009) [hereinafter
Child-Rearing Ability].
245. Id. at 864.
246. See id. at 867 (noting the fear that providers will potentially discriminate against
disabled individuals for fear of potential offspring and recommending that such refusals
only occur when the provider has a well-substantiated basis for thinking the individual
could not provide, or find others to provide, for the offspring. In cases of substance abuse,
child abuse history, etc., physicians are recommended to make their decisions based on
empirical evidence and not stereotype or prejudice, and involvement of psychologists or
mental health workers may be appropriate.).
247. Fertility Clinic Success Rate and Certification Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-493,
106 Stat. 3146 (1992); Child-Rearing Ability, supra note 244, at 864.
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D. Payment of Donors
Payment of donors is another significant disparity between organ
policies and reproductive medicine policies. For deceased organ do-
nation, the UAGA forbids payment—“[i]t shall be unlawful for any
person to knowingly acquire, receive, or otherwise transfer any human
organ for valuable consideration for use in human transplantation if
the transfer affects interstate commerce.”248 “ ‘[V]aluable consideration’
does not include the reasonable payments associated with the removal,
transportation, implantation, processing, preservation, quality control,
and storage of a human organ or the expenses of travel, housing, and
lost wages incurred by the donor of a human organ in connection with
the donation of the organ.” 249 Organ donation draws a distinction be-
tween remuneration to make a donor “whole again” after donations
versus a commercial market where individuals can knowingly sell
their organs for personal profit.250
A number of ethical arguments are advanced against payment.
Mainly, there is a concern that allowing for payment will lead to ex-
ploitation of the poor, with a two-tier system being created when the
poor donate the organs and the rich receive them.251 Critics also fear
that sale of human organs will devaluate human life, place a price on
human life, and create a vision of human beings as a means rather
than an end in themselves.252 However, the 1997 Bellagio Task Force
on Transplantation, Bodily Integrity, and the International Traffic in
Organs found no single ethical argument to support a universal pay-
ment on organs at all times, and this view has been echoed by many
prominent ethics scholars.253 Living organ donors are also prohibited
from receiving valuable consideration, and are left to cover their own
lost wages and other expenses incurred by their donation.254
248. 42 U.S.C. § 274e(a) (2006).
249. 42 U.S.C. § 274e(c)(2) (2006).
250. Id.
251. Jessica Cynowiec et al., Incentivizing Living Organ Donation, 14 CURRENT OPINION
IN ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION 201, 202 (2009).
252. See L.D. de Castro, Commodification and Exploitation: Arguments in Favour
of Compensated Organ Donation, 29 J. MED. ETHICS 142, 142 (2003); Opinion 2.15—
Transplantation of Organs from Living Donors, AM. MED. ASS’N, http://www.ama-assn
.org/ama/pub/physician-resources/medical-ethics/code-medical-ethics/opinion215.page?
(last updated June 2011) (“Living donors should not receive payment for any of their solid
organs. However, donors should be treated fairly; reimbursement for travel, lodging, meals,
lost wages, and the medical care associated with donation is ethically appropriate”).
253. D.J. Rothman et al., The Bellagio Task Force Report on Transplantation, Bodily
Integrity, and the International Traffic in Organs, 29 TRANSPLANTATION PROCEEDINGS
2739 (1997); A.S. Daar, Paid Organ Donation: The Grey Basket Concept, 24 J. MED. ETHICS
365, 365 (1998).
254. Amy L. Friedman, Payment for Living Organ Donation Should Be Legalised, 333
BMJ 746, 746 (2006).
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Organs are unique because payment is permitted in many other
bodily donations.255 Hair, blood, semen, ova, and plasma are all sale-
able for profit.256 Payment for gametes is, in fact, a burgeoning market
in the United States. Sperm donors receive smaller sums, around $100
for their less-invasive donations, but egg donors can conservatively
receive upwards of $3,000–$5,000 for one IVF cycle.257 Colloquially
known “Ivy League” eggs, or eggs from a donor who is attributed with
certain physical or intellectual features desirable to the recipient(s),
can garner up to $25,000–$50,000.258 ASRM has proposed a cap on
payment of egg donation, with payments of greater than $5,000 requir-
ing “justification” and sums above $10,000 being “not appropriate.” 259
In this sense, ASRM is suggesting the payment correlate to the level
of harm and inconvenience that the donor undergoes, but not for pay-
ment of the egg itself.260 Whereas there certainly have been critics in
opposition of payment for gametes, as well, the status quo is a com-
mercial market when personal profit is permissible. Similar concerns
of commodification and exploitation apply here as in organ donation.261
However, ASRM has supported payment of gamete donation for a
number of reasons. Mainly it provides fair compensation for the bur-
dens placed on the donor, without dampening the altruistic reasons
why a woman would donate.262 A true comparison of the ethics of pay-
ment for organs versus reproductive tissues would be expansive and
outside of the scope of this article. However, one major distinction is
that organ donation, up until the advent of RTT, will involve organs
which are necessary for life, like kidneys and livers.263 Though kidney
donors can live off of a single kidney, it has some medical impact and
there is always a risk that they will need a transplant if their second
kidney is compromised. Donation of a uterus or ovary will not present
the same concern.264 Though women may go through premature meno-
pause, just as they would with premature ovarian failure or hyster-
ectomy, reproductive organs are not necessary for life. If a woman
donated one ovary and the other ovary later failed, she would not need
a transplant to survive. There may be something ethically salient
255. Id. at 747.
256. Id.
257. Spar & Harrington, supra note 65, at 46–47.
258. Id. at 47.
259. Ethics Comm. of the Am. Soc’y for Reprod. Med., Financial Compensation of Oocyte
Donors, 88 FERTILITY & STERILITY 305, 308 (2007) [hereinafter Financial Compensation
of Oocyte Donors].
260. Id. at 306.
261. Id.
262. Id. at 307.
263. Nair, supra note 37, at 85; Rothman, supra note 253.
264. Rothman, supra note 253.
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about the fact that the egg is not a full bodily organ, although the
ovary is. It seems more likely that the concern is around the harm to
the donor and the fear of coercing them, through payment, into too
great a personal harm. Although more normative considerations are
necessary to address this key distinction between reproductive tissue
transplants and other types of organ transplant, there is a strong
argument that RTT should be treated more like gamete donation in
this context, and thus valuable consideration may be permissible.265
E. Parental Rights
The issue of parental rights has certainly never been addressed
in transplantation decisions. However, because the end goal of RTT
is to produce a child, RTT will raise all the same issues that gesta-
tional surrogacy and gamete donation raised with respect to paren-
tal rights.266
Parental rights of gamete donors come under a number of argu-
ments including genetic-identity argument (that genetic relation takes
precedence) as well as property rights over gametes.267 For surrogates,
arguments surround maternal bonds created through gestation and
birthing, and the best interests of the child.268 For intended parents,
their intent to have brought the child forth in the first place is often
a major focus for why they should have exclusive parental rights.269
Courts have split on custody rights for gamete donors and surrogates,
leading to some uncertainty for persons seeking the use of ART.
For surrogacy, state laws vary on whether surrogacy contracts
will be recognized and many cases turn on three factors: “whether the
surrogacy is traditional or gestational, whether the surrogate is com-
pensated beyond expenses, and the marital status and sexual orien-
tation of the intended parents.” 270 In states where surrogacy is illegal
or contractually unenforceable, states tend to split custody between
the genetic father and the surrogate mother.271 Two famous cases of
265. Financial Compensation of Oocyte Donors, supra note 259, at 307.
266. See John Lawrence Hill, What Does It Mean to Be a “Parent”? The Claims of Biology
as the Basis for Parental Rights, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 353, 355 (1991).
267. Id. at 388–89.
268. Id. at 389–90.
269. Id. at 415 (extending arguments in favor of the intended parents include the argu-
ment that “but for” the intended parents, the child would never have been conceived. Addi-
tionally, contractual arrangements often weigh in favor of intended parents, and making
intended parents the default custody ensures parentage for the child because not all ges-
tational surrogates will change their mind and want custody.).
270. Darra L. Hofman, “Mama’s Baby, Daddy’s Maybe”: A State-by-State Survey of
Surrogacy Laws and Their Disparate Gender Impact, 35 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 449, 460
(2009).
271. Id.
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surrogacy custody were Johnson v. Calvert272 and In the Matter of
Baby M.273 In Johnson, a couple donated their eggs and sperm and a
surrogate agreed to carry the child in exchange for $10,000 and life
insurance. When relationships between the couple and surrogate
soured, the surrogate fought for custody of the resulting child. The
California court held that “she who intended to procreate the child—
that is, she who intended to bring about the birth of a child that she
intended to raise as her own—is the natural mother.” 274 In the case
of Baby M, Mary Beth Whitehead was artificially inseminated by
William Stern’s sperm, making her both the surrogate as well as the
egg donor in the arrangement.275 The Supreme Court of New Jersey
rejected surrogacy arrangements as against public policy, but ac-
cepted a lower court’s “best interests” notion of determining paren-
tal rights.276 When remanded to the lower court, Stern was awarded
custody, but Whitehead was given visitation rights.277
With respect to gamete donors, courts continue to battle over
whether a donor does or should have parental rights.278 The issue
touches on complex state statutory and case law in fields of prop-
erty, family law, and inheritance law, and deals with matters of best
interests of the child, parental responsibility and neglect, and public
policy promotion in the use of ART and gamete donors.279 In a recent
Kansas Supreme Court case, the court held that a sperm donor who
wanted custody needed a prior written contract with the mother.280 In
another case, a sperm donor has won an appeal for parental rights.281
272. Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993).
273. Matter of Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988).
274. Johnson, 851 P.2d at 782.
275. Matter of Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1234.
276. Id.
277. Editorial, Justice for All in the Baby M Case, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 1988, http://www
.nytimes.com/1988/02/04/opinion/justice-for-all-in-the-baby-m-case.html.
278. See Michael J. Yarworsky, Rights and Obligations Resulting from Human Artificial
Insemination, 83 A.L.R. 4th 295 (1991).
279. See, e.g., id. (showing that “[i]n the absence of a governing statute, courts have
generally resorted to common-law principles, such as equitable and promissory estoppel
and effectuation of the intent of the parties, to decide contested issues involving parental
rights and obligations of donors and unmarried donees in connection with artificial in-
semination.”); Elizabeth E. McDonald, Sperm Donor or Thwarted Father? How Written
Agreement Statutes Are Changing the Way Courts Resolve Legal Parentage Issues in
Assisted Reproduction Cases, 47 FAM. CT. REV. 340 (2009).
280. See In re K.M.H., 169 P.3d 1025, 1028–29 (Kan. 2007); see also Jonathan Turley,
Sperm Donor Takes Case to Supreme Court Seeking Parental Rights (Mar. 19, 2008),
http://jonathanturley.org/2008/03/19/sperm-donors-takes-case-to-supreme-court-seeking
-parental-rights/.
281. See, e.g., Seymour Family Law, Father Wins Appeal for Parental Rights as Sperm
Donor (Jan. 21, 2012), http://www.lakevillefamilylawattorney.com/mt-bin/mt-search.cgi
?blog_id=11629&tag=Paternity&limit=20. There are now services available which assist
those born via sperm donation in finding their donor or their half-siblings. THE DONOR
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In another case, a sperm donor was given parental rights because the
pair did not use a physician, and instead performed the procedure
at home.282
The Uniform Parentage Act (UPA) provides some guidance. The
UPA of 2000 (and amended in 2002) specifically addresses reproduc-
tive technologies. It states that donors are “not a parent of a child con-
ceived by means of assisted reproduction.” 283 Likewise, for posthumous
reproduction, the deceased spouse is not the parent of the child unless
the decedent “consented in a record that if assisted reproduction were
to occur after death, the deceased spouse would be a parent of the
child.” 284 Additionally, in the case of gestational surrogacy when there
is a validated contract, the intended parents will be the parents of the
child with several procedural steps in place.285 Combined, these new
provisions of the 2000 UPA suggest that after the raging battle at the
state level of the courts, the UPA wishes to recognize intended par-
ents as the controlling norm where ART is used. Donors and surro-
gates thus are not, in the usual case, going to have parental rights
claims over the offspring produced by their volunteering/donation.
However, the application of UPA to RTT as currently framed is not
inclusive. First, for donors of eggs and sperm, the UPA defines donor
as “an individual who produces eggs or sperm used for assisted repro-
duction, whether or not for consideration.” 286 In RTT the donor argu-
ably produces whole reproductive organs or slivers for transplant,
and not assisted reproduction, so language would need to be altered
to encompass RTT donors. Likewise, with gestational surrogacy, the
gestational mother is defined as the woman who gives birth under a
gestational agreement.287 This will not control uterus donors, who will
not give birth to the child resulting from RTT.
The general intent of the UPA, however, does seem fitting to RTT.
For donors of ovaries and testicles (if it ever comes to stranger do-
nation), they present little unique issue beyond that of gamete donors.
The only significant difference is that the recipient of a whole ovary
or testicle can, if transplant is successful, continue to have multiple
SIBLING REGISTRY, https://www.donorsiblingregistry.com/; Amy Harmon, Getting to Know
a Sperm-Donor Dad, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 20, 2011, 5:25 PM), http://well.blogs.nytimes.com
/2011/10/20/getting-to-know-a-sperm-donor-dad/; Rachel Lehmann-Haupt, Are Sperm
Donors Really Anonymous Anymore?, SLATE (Mar. 1, 2010, 9:36 AM), http://www.slate.com
/articles/double_x/doublex/2010/02/are_sperm_donors_really_anonymous_anymore.html.
282. Jhordan C. v. Mary K., 179 Cal. App. 3d 386, 398 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986); McDonald,
supra note 279, at 345.
283. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 702 (2000).
284. Id. § 707.
285. Id. §§ 801–802.
286. Id. § 102(8).
287. Id. § 102(11).
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children with a single donation, whereas gamete donation is a one-
shot deal.288 For egg donors, women must match their ovulation cycles
with the recipient, and thus donation is a one-to-one mapping.289 How-
ever, egg donors often do not have dispositive control over resulting
embryos, which may be again used for reproduction, or disposed of, or
donated to research. Sperm donors often have even less involvement
because of cryopreservation.290 They bank amounts of sperm and
individuals or couples choose these samples, without knowledge of
the donor, so a donor conceivably may not know how many times his
sperm samples are used for reproductive purposes.291 As such, it seems
likely that, if it came to the courts, they would view the claims of RTT
donors to be similar to other gamete donors, as the usual standard
will be for custodial rights to go to intended parents, not donors.
For uterus donors, the claims to parenthood seem less than a
gestational surrogate, and thus the standard almost certainly become
standard custody for the intended parents, not the donor. Whereas
the uterus donor provides the necessary womb for pregnancy, not un-
like a gestational surrogate, the pregnancy does not occur within the
donor’s body. Thus the greater claim surrogates have over the result-
ing child because of emotional attachment and labor is not present
here.292 However, only nine of the fifty states have enacted the most
recent iteration of the UPA, suggesting that parental rights of RTT
donors may be a significant issue in the future.293
Testicle and ovarian tissue transplant will involve, in many in-
stances, cryopreservation of these materials.294 Storage of cryopre-
served reproductive materials, as well as dispositional authority of
the materials, was a complex question when embryo cryopreserva-
tion techniques first became viable.295 What should be done with a
288. Westphal, supra note 81.
289. How the Egg Donor Process Works, CTR. FOR HUM. REPROD., http://www.centerfor
humanreprod.com/egg_donor.htm (last visited Jan. 18, 2013).
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-untested-genetic-diseases.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
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292. See, e.g., Traditional or Gestational Surrogate?, SURROGACY911.COM, http://www
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293. Legislative Fact Sheet—Parentage Act, UNIF. LAW COMM’N, http://www.uniformlaws
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295. See Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992) (showing that divorce battles over
frozen embryos were prevalent. The Tennessee Supreme Court held that an embryo occu-
pies neither the rights of a legal person nor should be treated like property, but instead
occupies a special category where their potential for human life is respected. The court
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frozen ovary or testicle when someone dies or divorces? This issue
is fortunately not likely applicable to the case of RTT because it does
not involve combined gametic material, as an embryo does. However,
as in cases of posthumous reproduction, sometimes a partner wishes
to make use of the decedent’s reproductive tissue to procreate.296
Again, this is usually contingent upon some showing, during life, that
the decedent not only wished to procreate with the person requesting
use, but also that they anticipated procreating posthumously. As RTT
becomes a viable clinical procedure and individuals begin to bank
their reproductive tissues, the issue will almost certainly play out in
the courts as frozen embryo and posthumous conception cases have,
with these former cases likely playing strong models for the courts.
CONCLUSION
An analysis of the regulatory and ethical challenges raised by
RTT suggests that it is a two-headed creature that does not perfectly
fit in either an assisted reproduction or an organ transplantation
model. Determining what types of rules should apply to which fea-
ture of RTT greatly depends on whether the salient features of that
particular area, whether consent, allocation, etc. more closely mirrors
salient issues in reproduction or transplant.
With respect to a general body of rules, DHHS regulations are
more appropriate than FDA tissue regulations, because they open a
door for regulating complex allocation, consent, and disposition issues
which tissue regulation simply does not. However, traditional DHHS/
NOTA rules fall short with respect to addressing the unique repro-
ductive challenges raised by RTT, as well as issues of paying donors.
Moreover, to the extent that UAGA applies to deceased donation, it
will cause significant new dilemmas for RTT related to family dona-
tion which were never present in traditional organ transplantation.
Whereas RTT is still only in research phases it is imperative that
scholars and policy makers begin to think about how this two-headed
creature can be regulated in a way that properly respects the unique
reproductive and transplant issues it creates. However, many issues
of regulation are premature until we have a better notion of what
RTT would look like in clinical practice.
balanced the husband’s right not to produce against the wife’s right to produce, and favored
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As RTT continues to develop, a number of key regulatory ques-
tions should be considered, including foremost how to ensure protec-
tion of research participants in RTT trials. Additionally, once RTT
becomes clinically applicable, how do we ensure informed consent of
both donors and recipients in RTT, how do we properly allocate RTT
resources, how do we reconcile payment models for ART with trans-
plant, and who has custodial rights over the resulting offspring of
RTT? Although it is too early to predict all of the legal and ethical
issues raised by RTT or to anticipate regulatory solutions, it is imper-
ative that researchers begin to consider how to address these issues
before they become clinical practice without any form of guidance.
